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Abstract
We study how to maximize the broker’s (expected) profit in a two-sided market, where she
buys items from a set of sellers and resells them to a set of buyers. Each seller has a single
item to sell and holds a private value on her item, and each buyer has a valuation function over
the bundles of the sellers’ items. We consider the Bayesian setting where the agents’ values are
independently drawn from prior distributions, and aim at designing dominant-strategy incentive-
compatible (DSIC) mechanisms that are approximately optimal.
Production-cost markets, where each item has a publicly-known cost to be produced, provide
a platform for us to study two-sided markets. Briefly, we show how to covert a mechanism for
production-cost markets into a mechanism for the broker, whenever the former satisfies cost-
monotonicity. This reduction holds even when buyers have general combinatorial valuation
functions. When the buyers’ valuations are additive, we generalize an existing mechanism to
production-cost markets in an approximation-preserving way. We then show that the resulting
mechanism is cost-monotone and thus can be converted into an 8-approximation mechanism for
two-sided markets.
1 Introduction
Two-sided markets are widely studied markets in economics [Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983,
McAfee, 1992, McAfee, 2008], where a number of buyers and a number of sellers are connected by
an intermediary, such as antique markets, used-car markets, and pre-owned house markets. Here
each seller has a single item to trade for money and holds a private value for her owned item, while
each buyer’s private information is a general combinatorial valuation function over the bundles
of the sellers’ items. A common feature in these situations is that the intermediary keeps the
difference between the payments made by the buyers and the payments made to the sellers —that
is, the intermediary’s profit. We call such an intermediary a broker. The objective of the broker
is to acquire the items from the sellers and resell them to the buyers to maximize her profit. The
problem studied in our paper is to design the mechanism in the two-sided market that maximize
the broker’s profit. For convenience, we refer to the sub-market between the sellers and the broker
the seller-side market and to the sub-market between the broker and the buyers the buyer-side
market.
If the broker had all the items, then we would only have the buyer-side market, which is an
auction where the broker tries to maximize her revenue. Auctions have been well studied in the
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literature following the seminal work of Myerson [Myerson, 1981]. In Section 1.2, we will briefly
recall the most relevant literature on auctions. If the broker would keep the items, then we only
have the seller-side market, which is a procurement game. Budget feasible procurement has been
studied by many in the Algorithmic Game Theory literature [Singer, 2010, Dobzinski et al., 2011,
Chen et al., 2011, Chan and Chen, 2014]. The broker wants to maximize her value for the items
she buys, subject to a budget constraint.
Although auctions and procurements are closely related to the broker’s problem, they cannot
be dealt with separately in two-sided markets. Indeed, the difficulty of the broker’s problem is to
simultaneously and truthfully elicit both the sellers’ and the buyers’ valuations, so as to generate
a good profit.
1.1 Main Results and Techniques
In this paper we assume the values of the sellers and buyers are independently distributed, and
we study simple dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) mechanisms. To approximately
maximize the (expected) profit of the broker, we first develop a reduction, through which we can
directly convert mechanisms for production-cost markets into mechanisms for two-sided markets.
In a production-cost market, the broker is able to produce all the items, each item has a cost to be
produced and the costs are publicly known. Roughly speaking, we say a mechanism for production-
cost markets is cost-monotone if, when the cost of an item increases, the likelihood that it is sold
does not increase. We show that any cost-monotone mechanism for production-cost markets can
be converted into a mechanism for two-sided markets via a black-box approach. This reduction
holds for general combinatorial valuation functions of buyers.
Theorem 1 (Informal). Any cost-monotone DSIC mechanism that is an α-approximation for
production-cost markets, can be converted into a DSIC mechanism that is an α-approximation for
two-sided markets.
Next, we use cost-monotonicity as a guideline in constructing concrete mechanisms for two-
sided markets. When the buyers have additive valuations, we generalize the duality framework of
[Cai et al., 2016] and the mechanism there to design a cost-monotone mechanism for production-
cost markets. Following our reduction, we immediately obtain a mechanism for two-sided markets.
Theorem 3 (Informal). When the buyers have additive valuations, there exists a DSIC mecha-
nism for two-sided markets which is an 8-approximation to the optimal profit.
1.2 Related Work
Bayesian auctions have been extensively studied since the seminal work of [Myerson, 1981]. For
single-parameter settings, Myerson’s mechanism is optimal. The problem becomes more compli-
cated in multi-parameter settings [Hart and Nisan, 2017]. Although optimal Bayesian incentive-
compatible (BIC) mechanisms have been characterized [Cai et al., 2012b, Cai et al., 2012a], they
are too complex to be practical. Also, optimal DSIC mechanisms remain unknown. Thus, simple
DSIC mechanisms that are approximately optimal have been studied in the literature, such as
[Kleinberg and Weinberg, 2012, Yao, 2015, Cai et al., 2016]
Two-sided markets are also called double auctions [McAfee, 1992], bilateral trading
[Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983] or market intermediation [Jain and Wilkens, 2012] in the lit-
erature. Maximizing the broker’s profit is an important objective for two-sided market. The
seminal paper [Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983] characterized the optimal mechanism for one
seller and one buyer, which is further generalized by [Deng et al., 2014] to multiple single-
parameter sellers and buyers. Unlike our work, [Deng et al., 2014] studies the Bayesian Incen-
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tive Compatible (BIC) mechanisms. DSIC mechanisms are also studied in the literature, but
only for some special cases: [Jain and Wilkens, 2012] studies the case of a single buyer and mul-
tiple sellers, [Balseiro et al., 2019] studies the case of a single seller and multiple buyers, and
[Gerstgrasser et al., 2016] studies the optimal mechanism when the numbers of sellers and buy-
ers are both constants. Although [Chan and Chen, 2016] studies two-sided markets with multiple
buyers and multiple sellers, the dealer there has a fixed budget and their mechanism guarantees
that the payment to sellers is within the budget. Before our work, it remained unknown how to de-
sign a (simple) DSIC mechanism that approximates the optimal profit in multi-parameter settings
with a general number of sellers and buyers.
Finally, we briefly discuss the efficiency of two-sided markets, which is measured by gain-from-
trade (GFT), i.e., the total value gained by the buyers minus the value contributed by the sellers.
[McAfee, 1992] gave the first approximation mechanism for the one seller and one buyer case,
and [Brustle et al., 2017] gives approximation mechanisms for multiple buyers with unit demand
valuations. Recently, [Segal-Halevi et al., 2018a] and [Segal-Halevi et al., 2018b] study the asymp-
totically efficient mechanisms instead of constant approximations. For maximizing social welfare,
[Colini-Baldeschi et al., 2016, Colini-Baldeschi et al., 2017] provide constant-approximation mech-
anisms.
2 Preliminaries
A two-sided market includes a set M of m sellers, and a set N of n buyers. We consider the setting
where each seller j has one item j to sell, so we may refer to items and sellers interchangeably. The
total payment made by the buyers is the broker’s revenue, and her profit is the revenue minus the
total payment to the sellers.
Each buyer i has valuation vBi : 2
M → R+ ∪{0} with vBi (∅) = 0. The function v
B
i is monotone:
for any T ⊆ S ⊆ M , vBi (T ) ≤ v
B
i (S). In our reduction between production-cost and two-sided
markets, we consider combinatorial valuations and do not impose any restriction on vBi .
Each function vBi is independently drawn from a distribution D
B
i over the set of all possible
valuation functions, with density function fBi and cumulative probability F
B
i . Let D
B = ×i∈ND
B
i ,
fB = ×i∈Nf
B
i and F
B = ×i∈NF
B
i . Each seller j’s value on her item, v
S
j ∈ R
+∪{0}, is independently
drawn from a distribution DSj , with density function f
S
j and cumulative probability F
S
j . Let
DS = ×j∈MD
S
j , f
S = ×j∈Mf
S
j and F
S = ×j∈MF
S
j . Let the supports of distributions D
B
i and D
S
j
be TBi and T
S
j , respectively. T
B
i and T
S
j are called the valuation spaces of buyer i and seller j. Let
TB = ×i∈NT
B
i and T
S = ×j∈MT
S
j . Finally, denote by I = (N,M,D
B ,DS) a two-sided market
instance.
A mechanism M for two-sided markets is represented by (xB , xS , pB , pS). Given a valuation
profile (vB , vS),
• xB(vB , vS) , (xBi (v
B , vS))i∈N is the allocation of the buyers, where x
B
i (v
B , vS) =
(xBiA(v
B , vS))A⊆M with x
B
iA(v
B , vS) ∈ [0, 1], representing the probability that buyer i gets
the item set A, under valuation profile vB and vS . Moreover,
∑
A x
B
iA(v
B , vS) = 1.
• xS(vB , vS) = (xSj (v
B , vS))j∈M is the allocation of the sellers with x
S
j (v
B , vS) ∈ [0, 1], repre-
senting the probability that seller j’s item is sold under (vB , vS).
• pB(vB , vS) = (pBi (v
B , vS))i∈N is the payment of the buyers, where p
B
i (v
B , vS) ∈ R+ ∪ {0}.
• pS(vB , vS) = (pSj (v
B , vS))j∈M is the payment to the sellers, where p
S
j (v
B , vS) ∈ R+ ∪ {0}.
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A feasible mechanism M is such that
∑
A∋j
∑
i∈N
xBiA(v
B , vS) ≤ xSj (v
B , vS)
for any item j ∈M and any valuation profile (vB , vS). In principle, the above condition may allow
a mechanism to sell an item that it didn’t buy or to buy an item without selling it. However,
these cases never happen in the mechanisms in this paper.1 The expected profit PFT (M;I) of
mechanism M for instance I is
E
vS∼DS ;vB∼DB
∑
i∈N
pBi (v
B , vS)−
∑
j∈M
pSj (v
B , vS).
The utilities of the agents are quasi-linear. That is, for each buyer i, for any valuation subprofile
vB−i of the buyers and any valuation profile v
S of the sellers, when i reports her true valuation
function vBi , her utility under mechanism M is
uBi (v
B
i ;M, v
B
−i, v
S) =
∑
A⊆M
xBiA(v
B , vS)vBi (A)− p
B
i (v
B , vS).
For each seller j, for any valuation subprofile vS−j and v
B , when j reports her true value vSj , her
utility is
uSj (v
S
j ;M, v
B , vS−j) = p
S
j (v
B , vS)− vSj x
S
j (v
B , vS).
MechanismM is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) if: (1) for any buyer i, vB−i, v
S ,
and vBi , v
′B
i ,
uBi (v
B
i ;M, v
B , vS−i) ≥
∑
A⊆M
xBiA(v
′B
i , v
B
−i, v
S)vBi (A)− p
B
i (v
′B
i , v
B
−i, v
S);
and (2) for any seller j, vS−j , v
B and vSj , v
′S
j ,
uSj (v
S
j ;M, v
S
−j , v
B) ≥ pSj (v
B , v′Sj , v
S
−j)− v
S
j x
S
j (v
B , v′Sj , v
S
−j).
Mechanism M is individually rational (IR) if: (1) for any buyer i, vBi , v
B
−i and v
S ,
uBi (v
B
i ;M, v
B
−i, v
S) ≥ 0; and (2) for any seller j, vSj , v
S
−j and v
B , uSj (v
S
j ;M, v
S
−j , v
B) ≥ 0.
Mechanism M is Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC) if (1) for any buyer i and valuation
functions vBi , v
′B
i ,
uBi (v
B
i ;M) , E
vB
−i∼D
B
−i;v
S∼DS
uBi (v
B
i ;M, v
B
−i, v
S)
≥ E
vB
−i∼D
B
−i;v
S∼DS
[ ∑
A⊆M
xBiA(v
′B
i , v
B
−i, v
S)vBi (A) − p
B
i (v
′B
i , v
B
−i, v
S)
]
;
and (2) for any seller j and values vSj , v
′S
j ,
uSj (v
S
j ;M) , E
vB∼DB;vS
−j∼D
S
−j
uSj (v
S
j ;M, v
B , vS−j)
≥ E
vB∼DB;vS
−j∼D
S
−j
[
pSj (v
B , v′Sj , v
S
−j)− v
S
j x
S
j (v
B , v′Sj , v
S
−j)
]
.
1 Note that our feasibility constraint only requires “feasible in expectation” which is weaker than ex post feasibility.
All of our results still hold if we change the requirement to be ex post feasible.
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Mechanism M is Bayesian individually rational (BIR) if (1) for any buyer i and valuation
function vBi , u
B
i (v
B
i ;M) ≥ 0; and (2) for any seller j and value v
S
j , u
S
j (v
S
j ;M) ≥ 0.
Finally, we denote by OPT (I) the (expected) profit generated by the optimal DSIC mechanism
for instance I.
A special case of two-sided markets is production-cost markets, where the broker can produce the
items by himself and each item j ∈M has a publicly known production cost cj ∈ R
+∪{0}. Therefore
we do not need to consider the sellers’ incentives. Letting c , (cj)j∈M , we use I
c = (N,M,DB , c) to
denote a production-cost market instance andMc = (xB , pB) a production-cost market mechanism,
where the input of xB and pB is the buyers’ valuation profile. Then the broker’s profit is the revenue
minus the total production cost PFT (Mc;Ic), which is
E
vB∼DB
∑
i∈N

pBi (vB)−
∑
A⊆M
∑
j∈A
xBiA(v
B)cj

 .
Auctions are production-cost markets with cost 0. We use Ia = (N,M,DB) to denote an
auction instance and Ma = (xB , pB) an mechanism. The expected revenue is PFT (Ma;Ia) =
EvB∼DB
∑
i∈N p
B
i (v
B). When there is no ambiguity, the superscript B is omitted in auctions and
production-cost markets.
In Section 4, we will consider additive valuations for the buyers. In this case, for any buyer i,
there exists a valuation vector (vBij )j∈M such that v
B
ij = v
B({j}) is i’s value on each item j. Then, vBi
is additive if vBi (A) =
∑
j∈A v
B
ij for any A ⊆M . To simplify the notation, in this case we use v
B
i to
denote the vector (vBij )j∈M instead of the corresponding function. Each v
B
ij is independently drawn
from a distribution DBij , and D
B
i = ×j∈MD
B
ij . Finally, when buyers have additive valuations, their
allocation is simplified as xB(vB , vS) , (xBi (v
B , vS))i∈N , where x
B
i (v
B , vS) = (xBij(v
B , vS))j∈M with
xBij(v
B , vS) ∈ [0, 1], representing the probability that buyer i gets the item j, when the valuations
are vB and vS .
3 A Reduction from Two-sided markets to Production-Cost Mar-
kets
Note that the sellers are single-parameter in the two-sided markets under consideration. Thus, each
seller is truthful in a mechanism if and only if the selling probability of her item is non-increasing
with respect to her value and the payment to her is the threshold payment, i.e., the highest value
such that her item can still be sold. More precisely, for any single-value distribution D with density
function f and cumulative probability F , if D is a seller’s value distribution, then the virtual value
function is φS(v) = v + F (v)
f(v) . In addition, if D is not regular then φ
S is the ironed virtual value.
Following [Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983], for single-parameter sellers and any DSIC mechanism
M = (xS , xB , pS , pB), the total payment to the sellers is the virtual social welfare of them, i.e.,
E
vS∼DS
∑
j∈M
pSj (v
B , vS) = E
vS∼DS
∑
j∈M
φj(v
S
j )x
S
j (v
B , vS) (1)
for any valuation profile vB of the buyers.
We now show how to convert a mechanism for production-cost markets into a two-sided market’s
mechanism. The main idea is to use the sellers’ virtual values in two-sided markets as costs, and
run the mechanism for production-cost markets.
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Definition 1. A mechanism Mc = (x, p) for production-cost markets is cost-monotone if for any
two instances Ic = (N,M,Dc, c) and I ′c = (N,M,Dc, c′), where c and c′ differ only at an item j
and cj ≤ c
′
j , for any buyers’ valuation profile v
c ∼ Dc, the probabilities of item j being sold under
the two instances, xj ,
∑
i∈N
∑
A∋j xiA(v
c;Ic) and x′j ,
∑
i∈N
∑
A∋j xiA(v
c;I ′c), satisfy xj ≥ x
′
j .
Reduction. Let I = (N,M,DS ,DB) be a two-sided market instance. For any valuation
profile vS of the sellers, denote by φS(vS) , (φSj (v
S
j ))j∈M the sellers’ virtual-value vector, and let
Ic
φS(vS )
= (N,M,DB , φS(vS)) be a production-cost market instance.
We first show that the optimal profit of the two-sided market is no more than the optimal profit
generated by the corresponding production-cost markets in expectation.
Lemma 1. For any two-sided market instance I = (N,M,DB ,DS), OPT (I) ≤
EvS∼DSOPT (I
c
φS(vS )
).
Proof. It suffices to show that for any DSIC mechanism M = (xS , xB , pS , pB) for two-sided mar-
kets, there exists a DSIC mechanism Mc for production-cost markets such that PFT (M;I) ≤
EvS∼DSPFT (M
c;Ic
φS(vS)
). Indeed, this would imply PFT (M;I) ≤ EvS∼DSOPT (I
c
φS(vS )
) for any
M, and thus OPT (I) ≤ EvS∼DSOPT (I
c
φS(vS )
).
Given M and I, we define mechanism Mc = (xc, pc) as follows. For any instance Ic
φS(vS )
, Mc
first computes vS , the (randomized) pre-image of φS(vS) with respect to DS. In particular, if for
some seller j, the (ironed) virtual value φSj (v
S
j ) corresponds to a value interval in the support of
DSj , then v
S
j is randomly sampled from D
S
j conditional on it belongs to this interval.
For any reported valuation profile vB and buyer i ∈ N ,
xciA(v
B) = xBiA(v
B , vS)
for any A ⊆M , and
pci (v
B) = pBi (v
B , vS).
It is easy to see that, given any vS and vB−i, for any true valuation v
B
i , buyer i has the same utility
in Mc and M by reporting the same v′Bi . Thus M
c is DSIC whenever M is DSIC. Next, we
lower-bound the profit of Mc for each instance Ic
φS(vS)
.
PFT (Mc;IcφS(vS))
= E
vB∼DB
∑
i∈N

pci (vB)−
∑
A⊆M
xciA(v
B)
∑
j∈A
φSj (v
S
j )


= E
vB∼DB
E
vS∼DS |φS(vS)

∑
i∈N
pBi (v
B , vS)−
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N
∑
A∋j
xBiA(v
B , vS)φSj (v
S
j )


≥ E
vB∼DB
E
vS∼DS |φS(vS)

∑
i∈N
pBi (v
B , vS)−
∑
j∈M
φSj (v
S
j )x
S
j (v
B , vS)


The inequality above is because
∑
i∈N
∑
A∋j x
B
iA(v
B , vS) ≤ xSj (v
B , vS) holds for any feasible
mechanism, any j ∈M and any valuation profiles vB , vS . Thus,
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E
vS∼DS
PFT (Mc;IcφS(vS )) = E
φS(vS )∼φS(DS)
PFT (Mc;IcφS(vS ))
≥ E
vB∼DB
E
vS∼DS

∑
i∈N
pBi (v
B , vS)−
∑
j∈M
φj(v
S
j )x
S
j (v
B , vS)


= E
vS∼DS ,vB∼DB

∑
i∈N
pBi (v
B , vS)−
∑
j∈M
pSj (v
B , vS)

 = PFT (M,I),
as desired. Here φS(DS) is the distribution of virtual values induced by DS , and the second equality
is by Equation 1.
In the following, we show that if a mechanism for production-cost markets is cost-monotone,
then it can be converted into a mechanism for two-sided markets.
Lemma 2. Given any DSIC cost-monotone mechanism Mc for production-cost markets, there
exists a DSIC mechanism M for two-sided markets such that
PFT (M;I) = EvS∼DSPFT (M
c;IcφS(vS)).
Proof. Given mechanism Mc = (xc, pc), the mechanism M = (xS , xB , pS , pB) is defined as follows:
M first collects vB and vS reported by the buyers and the sellers, and then run Mc on the
production-cost instance Ic
φS(vS )
= (N,M,DB , φS(vS)) to obtain xc(vB) and pc(vB). Then for
each buyer i, let
xBiA(v
B , vS) = xciA(v
B)
for any A ⊆M and
pBi (v
B , vS) = pci (v
B).
For each seller j, let
xSj (v
B , vS) =
∑
i∈N
∑
A∋j
xciA(v
S , vB)
and let pSj (v
B , vS) be the threshold payment for j: namely, the highest reported value of seller j
such that the probability that item j is bought by the broker is xSj (v
B , vS).
We claim that M is DSIC. First, the buyers will truthfully report their valuations because
Mc is DSIC and each buyer has the same allocation and payment in M and Mc. For the sellers,
since Mc is cost-monotone and each (ironed) virtual value function φSj is non-decreasing in v
S
j , the
allocation xSj is non-increasing in v
S
j . As the payments to the sellers are the threshold payments,
the sellers are truthful as well.
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Next we show that
PFT (M,I) = E
vS∼DS ,vB∼DB

∑
i∈N
pBi (v
B , vS)−
∑
j∈M
pSj (v
B , vS)


= E
vS∼DS ,vB∼DB

∑
i∈N
pBi (v
B , vS)−
∑
j∈M
xSj (v
B , vS)φj(v
S
j )


= E
vB∼DB
E
φS(vS )∼φS(DS)

∑
i∈N
pci(v
B)−
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N
∑
A∋j
xciA(v
B)φj(v
S
j )


= E
φS(vS )∼φS(DS)
E
vB∼DB
∑
i∈N

pci(vB)−
∑
A⊆M
∑
j∈A
xciA(v
B)φj(v
S
j )


= E
vS∼DS
PFT (Mc;IcφS(vS )).
Thus Lemma 2 holds.
Combining Lemmas 1 and 2, we get our first main result.
Theorem 1. Given any DSIC mechanism Mc for production-cost markets, ifMc is cost-monotone
and is an α-approximation to the optimal profit, then there exists a DSIC mechanism M for two-
sided markets that is an α-approximation to the optimal profit.
Proof. Mechanism M is defined as in Lemma 2. For any two-sided market instance I,
PFT (M;I) = E
vS∼DS
PFT (Mc;IcφS(vS )) ≥
1
α
E
vS∼DS
OPT (IcφS(vS )) ≥
1
α
OPT (I),
where the equality is by Lemma 2 and the last inequality is by Lemma 1.
4 A Mechanism for Two-Sided Markets with Additive Valuations
4.1 Broker’s Profit in Production-Cost Markets
We first design a mechanism MA for production-cost markets which is an 8-approximation of the
optimal profit. Our mechanism is inspired by the mechanism in [Yao, 2015] and the duality frame-
work in [Cai et al., 2016] for auctions. In particular, with probability 34 , MA runs the mechanism
of [Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983] for two-sided markets for each item separately, denoted by
MIT . The mechanism of [Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983] is for a single buyer and a single seller,
but can be generalized to multiple buyers and a single seller as shown in [Deng et al., 2014]. Fur-
thermore,MA generalizes the bundling VCG mechanism of [Yao, 2015] to production-cost markets
(denoted by MBV CG) and runs it with probability
1
4 .
Essentially, MechanismMIT runs a second-price auction on the buyers’ virtual values, with a re-
serve price which is the production cost of the item. As shown in [Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983,
Deng et al., 2014], this mechanism is optimal for the broker’s profit when the buyers have single-
parameter valuations. Mechanism MBV CG is well studied in auctions [Yao, 2015, Cai et al., 2016],
and we describe it in Mechanism 1 for production-cost markets Ic = (N,M,D, c). Essentially, it is
a VCG mechanism with per-item reserve prices and per-agent entry fees.
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Mechanism 1 MBV CG for Production-Cost Markets
1: Collect the valuation profile v from the buyers.
2: For any buyer i and item j, let Pij(v−i) , maxi′ 6=i vi′j and βij(v−i) , max{Pij(v−i), cj}.
3: For any buyer i, set the reserve price for item j to be βij(v−i). Set the entry fee ei(v−i) to
be the median of the random variable
∑
j∈M(tij − βij(v−i))
+, where ti = (tij)j∈M ∼ Di and
x+ , max{x, 0} for any x ∈ R.
4: Each buyer i is considered to accept her entry fee if and only if
∑
j∈M(vij−βij(v−i))
+ ≥ ei(v−i).
5: If a buyer i accepts her entry fee, then she gets the set of items j with vij ≥ βij(v−i), and her
price is ei(v−i) +
∑
j:vij≥βij(v−i)
βij(v−i). If i does not accept her entry fee, then she gets no
item and pays 0.
It is not hard to see that both MIT and MBV CG are DSIC and IR. Indeed, the mechanism
of [Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983] is DSIC and IR, MIT directly applies it to each item, and
the buyers have additive valuations across the items. Moreover, MBV CG is DSIC and IR with
respect to any reserve prices βij that do not depend on vij , and Mechanism 1 simply incorporates
the production costs into reserve prices.
In Theorem 2 we use MA to upper-bound the optimal profit for any production-cost instance
Ic = (N,M,D, c), with proof provided in the full version. In fact, this proof is similar to the proof
in [Cai et al., 2016] with modifications to incorporate the production costs into consideration. Note
that [Brustle et al., 2017] also adapts the framework of [Cai et al., 2016] to the 2-sided market. But
their goal is to maximize the gain from trade and the buyers have unit-demand valuations.
Theorem 2 ([Brustle et al., 2017]). When the buyers have additive valuations, Mechanism MA is
DSIC and is an 8-approximation to the optimal profit for production-cost markets.
4.2 Converting MA to Two-sided Markets
Next we prove the cost-monotonicity for Mechanism MA. First, we start with Mechanism MIT .
Lemma 3. MIT is cost-monotone.
Proof. For any two production-cost instances Ic = (N,M,D, c) and I ′c = (N,M,D, c′), where
there exists an item j ∈ M such that c′j > cj and c
′
j′ = cj′ for any j
′ 6= j, we show that in
Mechanism MIT , when buyers’ valuation profile is v ∼ D, if item j is not sold in I
c, then item
j is not sold in I ′c. Since all buyers’ valuation functions are additive and MIT sells each item
individually, the result of selling one item does not effect any other item. In the mechanism of
[Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983], given the reported valuation profile v, the potential winner of
item j is the buyer who has highest virtual value on it, denoted by ij = argmaxi∈N vij . If her
virtual value φijj(vijj) is at least the cost of item j, buyer ij takes item j. Otherwise, item j is kept
unsold. Therefore, if item j is not sold in Ic, then φijj(vijj)−cj < 0 which implies φijj(vijj)−c
′
j < 0
and item j cannot be sold in I ′c. Thus MIT satisfies cost-monotonicity.
Next we showMBV CG is cost-monotone. Since we need to applyMBV CG to different instances
with different cost vectors c and c′, we explicitly write βij(v−i, cj) and ei(v−i, c) in Steps 2 and 3
of Mechanism 1.
Lemma 4. MBV CG is cost-monotone.
Proof. Similarly, for any two production-cost instances Ic = (N,M,D, c) and I ′c = (N,M,D, c′),
where there exists an item j ∈ M such that c′j > cj and c
′
j′ = cj′ for any j
′ 6= j, we show that in
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Mechanism MBV CG, when buyers’ valuation profile is v ∼ D, if item j is sold in I
′c, then item j
is also sold in Ic.
In MechanismMBV CG, given the valuation profile v, the potential winner of item j is the buyer
who has highest value on item j, denoted by ij = argmaxi∈N vij. When the cost vector is c, item j
is sold to ij if and only if ij accepts the entry fee eij (v−i, c) and vij − βijj(v−ij , cj) > 0. Otherwise
item j is unsold. Note that given different production cost c′, the potential winner of item j remains
unchanged.
Note that the entry fee ei(v−i, c) is selected such that the probability that buyer i accepts it is
exactly 12 . Let dj , βijj(v−ij , c
′
j)− βijj(v−ij , cj) be the increase of the item reserve in MBV CG for
buyer ij . Then
(vijj − βijj(v−ij , c
′
j))
+ + dj ≥ (vijj − βijj(v−ij , cj))
+. (2)
Indeed the equality holds in Inequality 2 if vijj − βijj(v−ij , c
′
j) ≥ 0.
Let e′ij , eij (v−ij , c) − dj. When the cost vector is c, buyer ij ’s utility is
uij =
∑
k∈M
(vijk − βijk(v−ij , ck))
+ − eij (v−ij , c).
When the cost is c′, if the entry fee is e′ij , buyer ij ’s utility is
u′ij (e
′
ij
) =
∑
k∈M
(vijk − βijk(v−ij , c
′
k))
+ − e′ij
=
∑
k 6=j
(vijk − βijk(v−ij , ck))
+ + (vijj − βijj(v−ij , c
′
j))
+ − e′ij
=
∑
k 6=j
(vijk − βijk(v−ij , ck))
+ + (vijj − βijj(v−ij , c
′
j))
+ − eij (v−ij , c) + dj
≥
∑
k 6=j
(vijk − βijk(v−ij , ck))
+ + (vijj − βijj(v−ij , cj))
+ − eij (v−ij , c) = uij .
The inequality above is by Inequality 2. Moreover, if vijj − βijj(v−ij , c
′
j) ≥ 0, then
u′ij (e
′
ij
) = uij . (3)
That is for any valuation profile vij , buyer ij ’s utility under the entry fee e
′
ij
and the cost vector
c′ is at least her utility under the entry fee eij (v−ij , c) and the cost vector c. Therefore,
Pr
tij∼Dij
[
∑
j∈M
(tijj − βijj(v−ij ))
+ ≥ e′ij ] ≥
1
2
.
Since the real entry fee eij (v−ij , c
′) is selected to be the median of the random variable
∑
j∈M(tijj−
βijj(v−ij ))
+, we have eij (v−ij , c
′) ≥ e′ij .
Now if under cost vector c′, item j is sold, then
vijj − βijj(v−ij , c
′
j) ≥ 0,
and ∑
k∈M
(vijk − βijk(v−ij , c
′
k))
+ − eij (v−ij , c
′) ≥ 0.
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Thus under cost vector c, we have
vijj − βijj(v−ij , cj) ≥ 0,
and by Equation 3,
uij = u
′
ij
(e′ij ) =
∑
k∈M
(vijk − βijk(v−ij , c
′
k))
+ − e′ij
≥
∑
k∈M
(vijk − βijk(v−ij , c
′
k))
+ − eij (v−ij , c
′) ≥ 0.
Therefore, under cost vector c, item j is also sold. That is, MBV CG is cost-monotone.
By randomly selecting from MIT and MBV CG, Mechanism MA is still cost-monotone. There-
fore, by Theorem 1, MA can be converted into a mechanism for two-sided markets, which is again
an 8-approximation to the optimal profit. Formally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. When the buyers have additive valuations, there exists a DSIC mechanism that is an
8-approximation to the optimal profit for two-sided markets.
5 Conclusion and Open Problems.
In this paper we provide the first DSIC mechanism that is a constant-approximation to the broker’s
optimal profit in multi-parameter settings with more than one buyer. We use production-cost
markets as a bridge between auctions and two-sided markets, and provide a general reduction from
production-cost markets to two-sided markets. How to design DSIC mechanisms for the broker’s
profit in multi-buyer multi-parameter settings under other valuation functions of the buyers (e.g.
unit-demand or sub-additive) is still open, and it would be interesting to understand the role of
production-cost markets in those scenarios.
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A Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 is almost the same with [Cai et al., 2016] with modifications to deal with
the production cost. We provide the full proof here for completeness. Similar to [Cai et al., 2016],
we only need to consider the prior distribution with finite support.
Arbitrarily fix a BIC-BIR mechanism M = (x, p). We consider M in its ex ante form. Specifi-
cally, for any buyer i with valuation vi and for any item j, let (a) xij(vi) , Ev−i∼D−ixij(vi, v−i) be
the probability that buyer i gets item j, over the randomness of the mechanism and v−i; and (b)
pi(vi) , Ev−i∼D−ipi(vi, v−i) be the expected payment made by i. Then the broker’s profit is
PFT (M;Ic) =
∑
i∈N
∑
vi∈Ti
Di(vi)

pi(vi)−
∑
j
xij(vi)cj

 ,
where Di(vi) is the probability of vi according to distribution Di.
Consider the constraints for M. Let T+i = Ti ∪ {⊥}, where “⊥” is a special symbol not in the
support Ti. Moreover, xi(⊥) , (0, . . . , 0) and pi(⊥) , 0. Because M is BIC and BIR, we have
xi(vi) · vi − pi(vi) ≥ xi(v
′
i) · vi − pi(v
′
i), ∀i ∈ N, vi ∈ Ti, v
′
i ∈ T
+
i (4)
In particular, when v′i = ⊥, the above constraint restricts the mechanism to be BIR. Therefore, the
problem of designing BIC-BIR mechanisms is to maximize PFT (M;Ic) subject to Inequality 4.
To upper-bound PFT (M;Ic), we first introduce some notations. For any buyer i, item j and
valuation sub-profile v−i ∈ T−i, let Pij(v−i) = maxi′ 6=i vi′j and βij(v−i) = max{Pij(v−i), cj}, as in
Mechanism MBV CG. In Mechanism 2 we generalize the 1-lookahead mechanism [Ronen, 2001] to
production-cost markets, denoted by M1LA. For any buyer i with valuation vi and for any item
j, let rij(v−i) = maxp≥βij(v−i)(p − cj) · Pry∼Dij [y ≥ p] and ri(v−i) =
∑
j∈M rij(v−i). Moreover, let
ri = Ev−i∼D−iri(v−i) and r =
∑
i ri. Then the profit of M1LA is exactly r and will be at most
PFT (MIT ;I
c).
Next, let R
(v−i)
0 = {vi ∈ Ti|vij ≤ βij(v−i) for all j} and R
(v−i)
j = {vi ∈
Ti|j is the smallest index such that j ∈ argmaxk∈M{vik−βik(v−i)} and vij −βij(v−i) > 0}. More-
over, let I[E] be the indicator of an event E. Now we are ready to upper-bound PFT (M;Ic).
By adopting the duality framework in [Cai et al., 2016] to production-cost markets, we have the
following.
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Mechanism 2 M1LA for Production-Cost Markets
1: Collect the valuation profile v from the buyers.
2: for each item j do
3: If no buyer has value for j higher than βij(v−i), keep j unsold.
4: Otherwise, let i be the highest bidder for j, and
ρij(v−i) , argmax
p≥βij(v−i)
(p− cj) · Pr
y∼Dij
(y ≥ p).
Sell the item j to buyer i with price ρij(v−i) if and only if vij ≥ ρij(v−i).
5: end for
Lemma 5. For any BIC-BIR mechanism M = (x, p) and production-cost instance Ic =
(N,M,D, c),
PFT (M;Ic) ≤ Single + Under + Over + Tail + Core,
where φij(vij) is Myerson’s (ironed) virtual value and
Single =
∑
i∈N
∑
vi∈Ti
∑
j∈M
Di(vi)xij(vi)(φij(vij)− cj) · Pr
t−i∼D−i
[
vi ∈ R
(t−i)
j
]
,
Under =
∑
i∈N
∑
vi∈Ti
∑
j∈M
Di(vi)xij(vi) ·

 ∑
t−i∈T−i
D−i(t−i)(vij − cj) · I[vij < βij(t−i)]

 ,
Over =
∑
i∈N
∑
vi∈Ti
∑
j∈M
Di(vi)xij(vi) ·
( ∑
t−i∈T−i
D−i(t−i)(βij(t−i)− cj)) · I[(vij ≥ βij(t−i)]
)
,
Tail =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
∑
t−i∈T−i
D−i(t−i)
∑
vij>βij(t−i)+ri(t−i)
Dij(vij)(vij − βij(t−i))
· Pr
vi,−j∼Di,−j
[∃k 6= j, vik − βik(t−i) ≥ vij − βij(t−i)],
Core =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
∑
t−i∈T−i
D−i(t−i) ·
∑
βij(t−i)≤vij≤βij(t−i)+ri(t−i)
Dij(vij) · (vij − βij(t−i)).
In the following, we use our mechanisms to bound the above terms separately. For any
production-cost instance Ic = (N,M,D, c), we define its corresponding single-parameter COPIES
instance Iˆc = (Nˆ ,M,D, c). More precisely, for each buyer i ∈ N , there are m copies for i in set
Nˆ , and the j-th copy of i (also denoted by (i, j)) is only interested in item j. Since in Ic, buyers’
valuations are additive, OPT (Iˆc) = PFT (MIT ;I
c).
In the following, we first use OPT (Iˆc) to bound Single, Under and Over, which implies that
these terms are upper-bounded by PFT (MIT ;I
c).
Lemma 6. Single ≤ OPT (Iˆc).
Proof. Note that if the allocation rule of M is feasible for Ic, then it is also feasible for Iˆc. Thus,
Single ≤
∑
i∈N
∑
vi∈Ti
∑
j∈M
Di(vi)xij(vi)(φij(vij)− cj) ≤ OPT (Iˆ
c).
14
The first inequality holds because Prt−i∼D−i [vi ∈ R
(t−i)
j ] ≤ 1, and the last inequality holds because
the optimal mechanism for single-parameter buyers maximizes the virtual social welfare.
Next we upper-bound Under. Essentially, the proof of Lemma 7 shares the same idea with
Lemma 15 in [Cai et al., 2016], but here we have to deal with multiple reserve prices for each item.
Lemma 7. Under ≤ OPT (Iˆc).
Proof. It suffices show that for any BIC-BIR mechanism M for Ic, there is a mechanism M′ for
the single-parameter instance Iˆc, which achieves profit at least as much as Under.
Given M = (x, p), we define M′ = (x′, p′) as follows. Randomly draw v ∼ D and run M on
v. If item j is sold to buyer i, let vij be item j’s reserve price in M
′. Then for instance Iˆc with
reported valuation profile t, run second-price auction with multiple reserve prices for each item.
That is for item j, the highest-bid buyer, say (ij , j), gets the opportunity to buy it and the price
is max{vij , βijj(t−ij)}. If tijj < max{vij , βijj(t−ij )}, item j is kept unsold.
Next we compare the profit of M′ and Under. Recall that xij(vi) =∑
v−i∼T−i
D−i(v−i)xij(vi, v−i). Thus Under can be rearranged as follows.
Under
=
∑
i∈N
∑
vi∈Ti
∑
j∈M
Di(vi)xij(vi) ·
∑
t−i∈T−i
D−i(t−i)(vij − cj) · I[vij < βij(t−i)]
=
∑
i∈N
∑
v∈T
∑
j∈M
D(v)xij(v)
∑
t∈T
D(t)(vij − cj) · I[vij < βij(t−i)]
=
∑
v∈T
D(v)(
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈T
D(t)
∑
j∈M
xij(v)(vij − cj) · I[vij < βij(t−i)]).
It is easy to see that Under is maximized by some deterministic allocation. So we focus on a
deterministic allocation rule x.
Let us consider the innermost summation. For any item j, denote by i the buyer such that
xij(v) = 1 and I[vij < βij(t−i)] = 1. Then vij is one of the reserve prices for item j in M
′. Next
we see how much profit does mechanism M′ make from selling item j.
If cj ≥ Pij(t−i), I[vij < βij(t−i)] = 1 implies vij < cj. In M
′, item j will be either sold with
price at least cj or unsold, which means the profit is always nonnegative from selling item j and
naturally greater than vij − cj < 0.
If cj < Pij(t−i), I[vij < βij(t−i)] = 1 implies vij < Pij(t−i). Note that the highest bidder for
item j (denoted by (ij , j)) must have value at least Pij(t−i). Since Pij(t−i) > vij and Pij(t−i) > cj ,
(ij , j) is willing to take item j at price max{vij , cj , Pijj(t−ij )} which is at least vij. Then the profit
is at least vij − cj .
Combining the above two cases,
PFT (M′; Iˆc) ≥
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈T
D(t)
∑
j∈M
xij(v)(vij − cj) · I[vij < βij(t−i)].
Therefore,
Under ≤
∑
v∈T
D(v)PFT (M′; Iˆc) ≤ OPT (Iˆc),
which finishes the proof of Lemma 7.
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Over is also upper-bounded by OPT (Iˆc), and the proof is almost the same with Lemma 14 of
[Cai et al., 2016], thus omitted here.
Lemma 8. Over ≤ OPT (Iˆc).
Next, we use PFT (M1LA;Ic) and PFT (MBV CG;Ic) to bound Tail and Core. Recall that
PFT (M1LA;I
c) = r ≤ OPT (Iˆc) = PFT (MIT ;I
c).
Lemma 9. Tail ≤ r.
Proof.
Tail
≤
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
∑
t−i∈T−i
D−i(t−i)
∑
vij>βij(t−i)+ri(t−i)
Dij(vij) · (vij − βij(t−i) + βik(t−i)− ck)
· Pr
vi,−j∼DBi,−j
[∃k 6= j, vik − βik(t−i) ≥ vij − βij(t−i)]
≤
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
∑
t−i∈T−i
D−i(t−i)
∑
vij>βij(t−i)+ri(t−i)
Dij(vij) · (vij − βij(t−i) + βik(t−i)− ck)
·
∑
k 6=j
Pr
vik∼D
B
ik
[vik − βik(t−i) ≥ vij − βij(t−i)]
≤
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
∑
t−i∈T−i
D−i(t−i) ·
∑
vij>βij(t−i)+ri(t−i)
Dij(vij)
∑
k 6=j
rik(t−i)
≤
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
∑
t−i∈T−i
D−i(t−i)ri(t−i) ·
∑
vij>βij(t−i)+ri(t−i)
Dij(vij)
≤
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
∑
t−i∈T−i
D−i(t−i)(ri(t−i) + βij(t−i)− cj) ·
∑
vij>βij(t−i)+ri(t−i)
Dij(vij)
≤
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
∑
t−i∈T−i
D−i(t−i)rij(t−i) = r.
The first and fifth inequalities are because βik(t−i) ≥ ck for all k ∈M . The second inequality is by
union bound. The third and sixth inequalities hold by the definition of rik(t−i).
Lemma 10. Core ≤ 2r + 2PFT (MBV CG;I
c).
Proof. For the random variable vij ∼ Dij, define the following two new random variables: bij(t−i) =
(vij − βij(t−i))I[vij ≥ βij(t−i)] and dij(t−i) = bij(t−i)I[bij(t−i) ≤ ri(t−i)]. Note that
∑
j bij(t−i) is
buyer i’ utility in the VCG mechanism with reserve price c. Then
Core =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
∑
t−i∈T−i
D−i(t−i) E
vi∼DBi
dij(t−i).
Set eˆi(t−i) =
∑
j∈M E
vi∼DBi
[dij(t−i)]− 2ri(t−i). By Lemma 12 in [Cai et al., 2016],
Pr[
∑
j∈M
dij(t−i) ≤ eˆi(t−i)] ≤
1
2
.
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Thus
Pr[
∑
j∈M
bij(t−i) ≥ eˆi(t−i)] ≥ Pr[
∑
j∈M
dij(t−i) ≥ eˆi(t−i)] ≥
1
2
.
Note that the entry fee ei(v−i) is the median of the random variable
∑
j∈M (vij − βij(v−i))
+,
then ei(v−i) ≥ eˆi(v−i) and Pr[
∑
j∈M bij(t−i) ≥ ei(t−i)] =
1
2 . Therefore,
PFT (MBV CG;I
c) ≥
1
2
∑
i∈N
∑
t−i∈T−i
D−i(t−i)eˆi(t−i) =
Core
2
− r.
Finally, we obtain the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 2. When the buyers have additive valuations, Mechanism MA is DSIC and is an 8-
approximation to the optimal profit for production-cost markets.
Proof. Combining Lemma 5 with Lemmas 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, for any BIC mechanism M = (x, p)
for production-cost markets and any production-cost market instance Ic = (N,M,D, c),
PFT (M;Ic) ≤ 6PFT (MIT ;I
c) + 2PFT (MBV CG;I
c).
By selling items using MIT with probability
3
4 and using MBV CG with probability
1
4 , we have an
8-approximation to the optimal profit.
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